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THE PROTECTION OF PATIENTS 
UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT 
Elizabeth S. Kraus* 
 
The vast consolidation among health-care providers in the aftermath of 
the Affordable Care Act’s enactment has led to much debate over the benefits 
of mergers in the health-care industry.  In 2016, the Federal Trade 
Commission filed motions in federal court to enjoin three hospital mergers 
in various parts of the country.  This amounted to more challenges to hospital 
mergers in a single year than any year in recent history.  Though two of these 
motions succeeded at the district court level, both were overturned on appeal, 
which led many to wonder what the effect of these decisions would be on 
future health-care mergers. 
While many fear that hospital mergers lead to higher prices for consumers, 
there are also those who contend that mergers lead to efficiencies, which 
allow merging parties to utilize resources more effectively, increase the 
quality of patient care and coordination, and potentially save lives.  This Note 
argues that the possibility of quality-enhancing or life-saving efficiencies is 
worth the risk that consumers see increased prices.  To allow mergers that 
may realize these types of efficiencies, antitrust enforcement agencies and 
courts must begin placing greater weight on merging parties’ efficiency 
arguments by easing the current standard.  Additionally, in light of new 
research suggesting that cross-market health-care mergers, or mergers 
between providers in different geographic markets, affect bargaining 
dynamics between providers and insurers, this Note argues that parties’ 
relative bargaining power must be considered in agencies’ and courts’ 
analyses of the competitive landscape relevant to a merger. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Competition among health-care providers benefits consumers by 
incentivizing firms to offer lower-priced services of higher quality and gives 
consumers greater choice.1  Mergers2 have the potential to enhance or harm 
 
 1. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“The 
assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market 
recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—and not just 
the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative 
offers.”). 
 2. This Note uses the term “merger” to refer to mergers, acquisitions, affiliation 
agreements, joint ventures, and similar transactions.  
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competition.3  In the United States, the antitrust laws grant power to federal 
officials to regulate competition and protect consumers.4  The Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have the power to 
investigate and challenge mergers that are likely to have anticompetitive 
effects.5 
There are many reasons why health-care providers may seek to merge.  A 
merged firm may use its resources more efficiently, obtain tax benefits, or 
diversify its portfolio to smooth corporate earnings over the business cycle.6  
Additionally, hospitals may merge to spread high fixed costs over a larger 
patient population,7 coordinate patient care,8 reduce duplicative costs,9 or 
avoid penalties imposed by the government for readmitting discharged 
patients for continued care of prior illnesses.10  Merging increases the 
likelihood that the hospital system will provide all the relevant services for a 
patient’s illness and decreases the chance that a patient will be readmitted 
because a prior hospital visit failed to provide adequate treatment.11 
Firms’ incentives to merge play a crucial role in the antitrust review 
conducted by the FTC and DOJ (“the agencies”).12  The agencies seek to 
determine the likely effects of a proposed merger.13  This guessing game 
requires knowledge of the industry, the way in which the merged firm may 
profit, and the benefits that consumers may see.14  The agencies consider all 
of this information to determine whether the proposed merger is likely to 
substantially lessen competition.15 
Mergers that result in high market share and increased market 
concentration are presumed to reduce competition and lead to price increases 
 
 3. See Peter Bamford et al., Mergers, in A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 41, 41–44, 49 (1999). 
 4. See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/N87A-
PR7W] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).  
 5. The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers [https://perma.cc/9VY8-A8CZ] 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 6. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW 
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 460–62 (5th ed. 2016).  
 7. See Leigh L. Oliver & Robert F. Leibenluft, A Mixed Bag:  Sorting Out Efficiencies 
Arguments in Hospital Mergers, ANTITRUST, Fall 2015, at 18, 21–22. 
 8. Id. at 22–23. 
 9. Id. at 21.  
 10. William M. Sage, Assembled Products:  The Key to More Effective Competition and 
Antitrust Oversight in Health Care, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 655 n.216 (2016); Thaddeus J. 
Lopatka, Note, Cross-Market Mergers in Healthcare:  Adapting Antitrust Regulation to 
Address a Growing Concern, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 832–33 (2017).  
 11. Lopatka, supra note 10, at 833. 
 12. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 1–2 (2010) 
[hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]; see also Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 
U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[K]nowledge of intent may help the [adjudicator] to interpret facts and 
to predict consequences.”). 
 13. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, §§ 1–2 (discussing the agencies’ 
goals during merger investigations and the evidence they rely upon); see also Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 14. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, §§ 1–2. 
 15. Id. § 1.  
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that harm consumers.16  Where harm to competition is small, the agencies 
may decline to challenge a merger if they also find that efficiencies,17 which 
will benefit consumers, will likely occur.18  Courts may also allow a merger 
to be consummated on these grounds but rarely do.19  Courts hesitate to 
accept parties’ arguments that future efficiencies will offset the harm to 
competition.20  Alternatively, the agencies have argued that efficiencies will 
not justify an otherwise highly anticompetitive merger.21 
This Note argues that courts need to give greater weight to hospitals’ 
efficiency arguments and parties’ relative bargaining power because 
efficiencies in hospital mergers are worth the risk of higher prices.  
Additionally, parties’ relative bargaining power is a necessary consideration 
for understanding the relationship between merging health-care providers 
and their competitors. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the antitrust laws, the merger-
review process, and new evidence explaining the effects of cross-market 
hospital mergers on competition.  Part II discusses the evolution of the 
efficiency defense, arguments for and against placing greater weight on 
parties’ efficiency arguments, and common efficiency arguments presented 
by merging hospitals in court and why they fail.  Finally, Part III suggests 
how courts should interpret parties’ efficiency arguments.  Part III also 
proposes a new efficiency argument that the agencies and courts should 
consider in their review of mergers. 
 
 16. Id. § 2.1.3.  
 17. Common efficiencies that may result following a hospital merger include improved 
quality of care, upgraded facilities and equipment, and better utilization of hospital capacity. 
See MONICA NOETHER & SEAN MAY, HOSPITAL MERGER BENEFITS:  VIEWS FROM HOSPITAL 
LEADERS AND ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 4–10 (2017), http://www.crai.com/sites/default/ 
files/publications/Hospital-Merger-Full-Report-_FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7R7-
KAVL]. 
 18. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 10; see also Richard D. Raskin & 
Bruce M. Zessar, Telling the Efficiencies Story:  Practical Lessons from the Hospital Merger 
Field, ANTITRUST, Spring 1999, 21, 21 (noting that “the agencies recognize that efficiencies 
generated by a merger may lead to lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new 
products”). 
 19. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 
789 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[N]one of the reported appellate decisions have actually held that 
[merging parties] rebutted a prima facie case with an efficiencies defense . . . .”). 
 20. See id. at 789–90.  Agencies, however, have allowed transactions to proceed where 
potential efficiencies outweighed the potential harm to competition. See Edith Ramirez, 
Chairwoman, FTC, Remarks at the Ninth Annual Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium:  
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines Five Years Later 11 (Sept. 29, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/805441/ramirez_-
_georgetown_antitrust_enforcement_symposium_9-29-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NR9-
ZYS9].  
 21. See Brief of Appellees the United States of America and Plaintiff States at 28, United 
States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 17-5024) (“The policy of the 
antitrust laws—including Section 7—bars the argument that anticompetitive effects promote 
consumer welfare and thus justify an anticompetitive merger.”); Brief of the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at 28, FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. 
Ctr., 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 16-2365). 
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I.  MERGERS ARE SUBJECT TO ANTITRUST REVIEW 
To understand the way in which agencies and courts currently analyze 
mergers, it is necessary to understand the purposes of the antitrust laws, why 
the antitrust laws were enacted, and how the agencies and courts have 
interpreted them.  Part I.A discusses the historical beginnings of the antitrust 
laws as they relate to potentially anticompetitive mergers.  Part I.B explains 
the merger-review process.  Part I.C then discusses the substance of the 
agencies’ merger review, specifically in the context of hospital mergers.  
Next, Part I.D explores courts’ analyses of merger challenges brought by the 
FTC.  Finally, Part I.E presents new evidence that certain hospital mergers 
may result in higher prices because the merged parties have greater 
bargaining power. 
A.  The Antitrust Laws Preserve Competition to Protect Consumers 
Three laws form the foundation of past and present antitrust 
enforcement22:  the Sherman Act,23 the Clayton Act,24 and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTC Act).25  The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, was the 
first of these laws.26  In the years preceding its enactment, the Industrial 
Revolution had caused drastic changes to the nature of business and 
competition.27 
The dominant economic theory of the time was laissez-faire capitalism, 
whereby the government did not intervene or attempt to regulate businesses’ 
operations.28  Many believed, and some still believe, that laissez-faire 
capitalism benefits society by enabling those with the most skill to advance 
to the top of their fields and share the best products and services in the 
marketplace.29  In application, this policy allowed trusts30 to gain control of 
certain industries, most notably railroads, oil, steel, and sugar.31  Because 
 
 22. Arjun Mishra, History of Antitrust Laws, JURIST (Dec. 30, 2013, 8:53 PM), 
http://www.jurist.org/feature/2013/12/a-history-and-the-main-acts.php 
[https://perma.cc/FS6Y-YGDD]. 
 23. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).  
 24. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012).  
 25. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012). 
 26. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–7). 
 27. See NORMAN WARE, WEALTH AND WELFARE:  THE BACKGROUNDS OF AMERICAN 
ECONOMICS 103–05 (1949). 
 28. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE REINS OF POWER:  A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 140, 143 (1963). 
 29. Id. at 143. 
 30. The trust was an organization of business competitors that delegated authority to a 
trustee to make decisions about industry-wide pricing and output. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., 
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE:  CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 
103 (3d ed. 2017).  During the Industrial Revolution, all monopolies were colloquially referred 
to as trusts. Prather S. McDonald, A Colloquial upon the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 1 TENN. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1923).  For a discussion of the economic conditions that affected the formation of 
trusts, see Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2279, 2292–334 (2013).  
 31. FTC Fact Sheet:  Antitrust Laws:  A Brief History, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 1, 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/games/off-site/youarehere/pages/pdf/FTC-
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these industries centralized supply and set prices, prices drastically increased 
and businesses were not incentivized to offer quality products.32 
Many Americans, dissatisfied with decreased quality and increased prices, 
called upon the government to regulate the trusts.33  In response, Congress 
passed the Sherman Act, which states that “[e]very person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony.”34 
The Sherman Act was a “paper tiger” for the first twelve years of its life.35  
Courts continuously ruled in favor of businesses and found no violations of 
the Sherman Act.36  For instance, in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,37 the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendants’ monopoly in the manufacturing 
of refined sugar was not illegal under the Sherman Act because the business 
did not constitute commerce and only commerce could be regulated by the 
Sherman Act.38  In so holding, the Court found a loophole to the antitrust law 
and allowed the monopoly to remain.39 
Despite prosecutorial setbacks such as this, President Theodore Roosevelt 
continued to encourage the DOJ to bring suits against monopolies under the 
Sherman Act.40  In the landmark case Northern Securities Co. v. United 
States,41 the Court held for the first time that the combination into a trust of 
several railroads was a violation of the Sherman Act and mandated the 
monopoly’s dissolution.42 
After Northern Securities, businesses discovered that they could continue 
to control prices and production by lawfully merging instead of forming 
trusts.43  The resulting increase in mergers and the limited ability of the 
Sherman Act to block them sparked the adoption of the Clayton and FTC 
Acts in 1914.44  Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits a merger if “the effect 
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to 
 
Competition_Antitrust-Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/43Y7-ZTUL] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018); 
see also LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 208–21 (1933); McDonald, supra 
note 30, at 1.  
 32. See BRANDEIS, supra note 31, at 212; Dow Votaw, Antitrust in 1914:  The Climate of 
Opinion, 24 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 14, 16–17 (1964). 
 33. Jonida Lamaj, The Evolution of Antitrust Law in USA, 13 EUR. SCI. J. 154, 161 (2017). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
 35. The Trust Buster, U.S. HIST., http://www.ushistory.org/us/43b.asp [https://perma.cc/ 
2ERU-LM2Y] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018); see also Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 
96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16 (2008). 
 36. See Crane, supra note 35, at 16 (“[T]he Act was rarely used and, when it was, its axe 
most often fell on labor rather than capital.”). 
 37. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 38. Id. at 12.  
 39. See id. 
 40. See Crane, supra note 35, at 17–18; Votaw, supra note 32, at 19.  
 41. 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
 42. Id. at 357–60.  
 43. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
117 (1955) (noting the “limitations of . . . the Sherman Act in curbing mergers”). 
 44. See Votaw, supra note 32, at 19–20, 27. 
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create a monopoly.”45  Additionally, to help the DOJ in enforcing the antitrust 
laws, Congress passed the FTC Act, which created the FTC, an independent 
federal agency.46  The FTC Act gave the FTC the power to take action against 
parties engaging in “unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”47 
About sixty years later, Congress passed another important antitrust law:  
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (“HSR Act”).48  
The HSR Act requires parties to large mergers49 to give the DOJ and FTC 
advance notice of the proposed mergers.50  In effect, the HSR Act solidified 
the agencies’ ability to prospectively review mergers and stop 
anticompetitive mergers at the outset.51 
Today, the overarching purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect 
competition within the marketplace.52  The idea behind this goal is that free 
and open competition benefits consumers by incentivizing businesses to offer 
lower-priced and higher-quality goods or services to attract customers.53  
This ideology is not so different from the laissez-faire view from the 
nineteenth century.54  However, the antitrust laws enable the government to 
ensure the marketplace remains competitive, which protects consumers from 
higher prices and other harmful effects.55 
B.  The FTC and DOJ Review Proposed Mergers 
The FTC and DOJ are responsible for investigating potentially 
anticompetitive mergers.56  The agencies seek to determine whether a merged 
firm will be able to increase prices or reduce quality postmerger due to 
increased market power.57  This Part discusses the regulatory investigation 
process to which most mergers are subject. 
 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 48. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 49. The HSR Act only requires that mergers of a certain value be reported to the DOJ and 
FTC. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012).  The threshold amount is adjusted each year.  In 2017, parties 
were required to submit an HSR premerger notification filing (HSR filing), so named for the 
HSR Act, for mergers valued in excess of $80.8 million. See Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds 
for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 8524, 8524 (Jan. 26, 2017). 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 18a.  
 51. Id.; Milestones in FTC History:  HSR Act Launches Effective Premerger Review, FED. 
TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/03/ 
milestones-ftc-history-hsr-act-launches-effective [https://perma.cc/8E5A-ZNDF] (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2018).  
 52. FTC Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 1; Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. 1 (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/800691/download 
[https://perma.cc/27F3-7TY6]. 
 53. Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, supra note 52, at 1. 
 54. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.  
 55. Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, supra note 52, at 1–2. 
 56. Id. at 3; FTC Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 2. 
 57. Lopatka, supra note 10, at 824.  
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If a transaction meets the size requirements prescribed by the HSR Act,58 
the merging parties must inform the DOJ and FTC of their intent to merge 
before the merger is consummated.59  Parties do so by submitting premerger 
filings, often referred to as HSR filings, to the agencies in accordance with 
the HSR Act.60  The HSR filings provide the agencies with key information 
about the proposed merger, the merging parties’ businesses, and the industry 
or industries that the merger will affect.61 
Although merging parties submit HSR filings to both the FTC and DOJ, 
only one agency62 reviews the proposed transaction.63  The agency 
responsible for reviewing the merger is usually designated based upon the 
agencies’ expertise in different industries.64  For instance, the FTC usually 
reviews mergers between health-care providers, such as hospitals65 and 
physician groups,66 while the DOJ usually reviews mergers between health 
insurance providers (“payers”).67 
After submitting their HSR filings, parties must wait for agency clearance 
before consummating the merger.68  The reviewing agency initially has thirty 
days to complete its preliminary review.69  Based on its findings, the 
reviewing agency may either (1) allow the parties to merge by granting early 
termination of the thirty-day waiting period, (2) allow the merger by letting 
the thirty-day waiting period expire without taking further action, or 
(3) extend the review period by issuing a request for more information, 
 
 58. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 59. Premerger Notification Program, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/ 
enforcement/premerger-notification-program [https://perma.cc/GJE2-67FN] (last visited Mar. 
15, 2018). 
 60. Id.; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.  
 61. What Is the Premerger Notification Program?:  An Overview, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION 1 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/premerger-
introductory-guides/guide1.pdf [https://perma.cc/923Q-EY4D]; see also Premerger 
Notification Program, supra note 59. 
 62. State Attorneys General may also review transactions and enforce state and federal 
antitrust laws. HSR Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2012); Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the 
Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8 
(2004).  This Note focuses on antitrust enforcement by the federal agencies. 
 63. Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-
laws/mergers/premerger-notification-merger-review [https://perma.cc/5RFE-T6EY] (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 64. Michael G. Egge & Jason D. Cruise, Practical Guide to the U.S. Merger Review 
Process, CONCURRENCES, Feb. 2014, at 1, 3; Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to European Competition Forum 2014, Public and 
Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States 5 (Feb. 11, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517756/download [https://perma.cc/7WEA-7BW8].  
 65. See generally, e.g., FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 
2016); FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016).  
 66. See generally, e.g., FTC v. Sanford Health, No. 1:17-cv-00133 (D.N.D. Dec. 15, 
2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-3783 (8th Cir. Dec. 26, 2017). 
 67. See generally, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017).  
 68. Merger Review, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-
resources/mergers-and-competition/merger-review [https://perma.cc/38WV-8GME] (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2018).  
 69. Egge & Cruise, supra note 64, at 3.  
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known as a “Second Request.”70  Agencies typically issue a Second Request 
when the initial review identifies potential anticompetitive concerns and the 
agencies need more information to confirm or allay the concerns.71  A Second 
Request allows the agency to further investigate the merger’s likely effects 
on competition.72 
After the agency completes its Second Request investigation, the agency 
will either allow the merger to be consummated, approve a modified merger 
plan, or attempt to block the merger by suing in federal court and/or initiating 
an FTC administrative proceeding.73  Most transactions are approved in 
original or modified form.74  The agencies challenge very few in court or 
FTC administrative proceedings.75 
The process for challenging a merger beyond the investigation period 
differs based on which agency has reviewed the transaction.76  For instance, 
the DOJ will typically seek a permanent injunction in federal court,77 whereas 
the FTC will typically seek a preliminary injunction in federal court to enjoin 
the merger until the matter can be decided by the FTC’s administrative 
 
 70. Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, supra note 63.  A buyer can 
also withdraw its HSR filing one time and refile within two business days without repaying 
the filing fee. FTC Withdraw and Refile Notification, 16 C.F.R. § 803.12 (2018).  This gives 
the parties more time to work through issues with the FTC or DOJ and may allow the parties 
to avoid a time-consuming and costly Second Request. See Premerger Notification Office 
Staff, Getting in Sync with HSR Timing Considerations, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 31, 
2017, 8:57 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2017/08/ 
getting-sync-hsr-timing-considerations [https://perma.cc/57VW-FQQ8]. 
 71. Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, supra note 63.   
 72. Merger Review, supra note 68. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. See William McConnell, Obama Administration Most Aggressive Ever in Regulating 
Mergers and Acquisitions, THESTREET (Apr. 28, 2016, 11:27 AM), 
https://www.thestreet.com/story/13538758/1/big-government-steps-up-challenges-to-big-
business-in-merger-wars.html [https://perma.cc/F49J-BVJY] (stating that, although the 
number of mergers challenged since the Reagan administration has increased, the percentage 
of transactions challenged by the DOJ and FTC peaked at fewer than 5 percent between 1981 
and 2015).  In 2015, there were 1754 merger transactions reported to the agencies. 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, TRENDS IN MERGER INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT AT THE 
U.S. ANTITRUST AGENCIES:  FISCAL YEARS 2006–2015, at 3 (2d ed. 2016), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Trends-in-Merger-Investigations-and-
Enforcement-2006-2015 [https://perma.cc/EZS4-Q2YF].  Only forty-two of these 
transactions, or approximately 2 percent, were challenged. Id. at 12. 
 76. Shepard Goldfein & James A. Keyte, Merger Review at FTC and Department of 
Justice, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 2014, at 1, 1 (“[The agencies] sue[] to enjoin mergers under different 
statutes:  the FTC under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act and Justice Department under Section 
15 of the Clayton Act.”).  As of this writing, a proposed bill—the Standard Merger and 
Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules (SMARTER) Act—seeks to eliminate the 
differences in challenges brought by the FTC and DOJ. Standard Merger and Acquisition 
Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2017, H.R. 659, 115th Cong.; see also Daniel A. 
Friedman & Melissa R. Ginsberg, “SMARTER” Act Advances in Congress:  Will It Become 
Law?, PATTERSON BELKNAP (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.pbwt.com/antitrust-update-
blog/smarter-act-advances-in-congress-will-it-become-law [https://perma.cc/GEU5-9MXM]. 
 77. Goldfein & Keyte, supra note 76, at 1 (noting that the DOJ often consolidates its 
claims for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
65(a)(2)). 
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court.78  Despite this difference, a court’s decision on a preliminary 
injunction challenge brought by the FTC is often the final ruling.79  Losing 
parties typically abandon the deal before proceeding to the FTC hearing.80  
Similarly, upon defeat, the FTC will likely abandon its challenge.81 
C.  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines Explain 
the Agencies’ Merger Review 
The agencies have identified two types of mergers that are likely to 
substantially lessen competition or lead to monopolies:  vertical mergers and 
horizontal mergers.82  A vertical merger is one between businesses at 
different levels within an industry.83  For instance, a merger between a 
supplier of goods and the retailer who sells the goods would be a vertical 
merger.  The agencies define horizontal mergers as “mergers and acquisitions 
involving actual or potential competitors.”84  A merger between two 
competing retailers would be a horizontal merger. 
The FTC and DOJ have jointly published two sets of guidelines, which 
help practitioners and the business community understand the agencies’ 
processes for reviewing mergers:  the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines and 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.85  Lawyers seeking to defend vertical 
mergers may turn to the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued in 1984, 
to understand the theories under which an agency may challenge a 
nonhorizontal merger.86  However, this set of guidelines is not very useful 
 
 78. Id. at 2.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.; see also Respondents’ Memorandum Addressing the Propriety of Proceeding with 
the Part 3 Trial When Respondents Cannot Yet Close the Transaction at 11 n.2, In re Cabell 
Huntington Hosp., Inc., No. 9366 (FTC dismissed July 6, 2016) (“[T]he pending injunction 
hearing in the federal court . . . generally hangs like a Sword of Damocles over [the FTC 
administrative] proceeding.”).   
 81. Goldfein & Keyte, supra note 76, at 2. 
 82. The FTC’s website actually identifies three types of mergers that are likely to be 
anticompetitive:  vertical mergers, horizontal mergers, and “potential competition mergers.” 
Competitive Effects, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/competitive-effects [https://perma.cc/7G9Q-2C8S] 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2018).  Prior to 2010, a horizontal merger involved the combination of 
two actual competitors and a potential competition merger involved the combination of two 
potential competitors. See id.  In 2010, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines were updated to 
combine the latter two categories of mergers. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra 
note 12, § 1.  Horizontal mergers are now defined in the Guidelines as “mergers and 
acquisitions involving actual or potential competitors.” See id. 
 83. Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Potential Competitive Effects of Vertical 
Mergers:  A How-To Guide for Practitioners 4 (Dec. 8, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2522179 [https://perma.cc/FLG9-GYVF]. 
 84. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 1. 
 85. See generally HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12; U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1984) [hereinafter NON-HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
 86. See generally NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 85. 
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today because the agencies apply theories of competitive effect that are not 
included in the Guidelines.87 
Luckily for practitioners seeking to defend a merger between two health-
care providers, a different set of guidelines is available.  Most hospital 
mergers evaluated by the FTC are horizontal mergers.88  As such, the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines describe the evidence and analytic tools the 
agencies utilize to determine whether a merger will violate the federal 
antitrust laws.89  The Guidelines were most recently updated in 2010 to more 
accurately describe the agencies’ practices and are a helpful tool for the 
business community and private antitrust practitioners.90 
Most mergers are brought to the agencies’ attention through an HSR filing 
before they are consummated.91  One difficulty agencies face in reviewing 
unconsummated mergers is uncertainty.92  The agencies cannot be sure 
whether anticompetitive effects will, in fact, result.93  Because of this, the 
agencies review an array of evidence to make an informed prediction.94 
Part I.C.1 of this Note discusses how the agencies define the relevant 
market in which merging parties compete.  Part I.C.2 explains how the 
agencies evaluate postmerger market share and changes to market 
concentration.  Part I.C.3 then discusses the defenses that merging parties 
may assert. 
1.  The Relevant Market 
To predict a proposed merger’s likely impact on competition, the agencies 
must first define the market.95  A market is defined by how and where the 
merging parties compete.96  For instance, hospitals may compete in the 
 
 87. Jon Sallet, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Litig., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks 
as Prepared for Delivery to ABA Fall Forum:  The Interesting Case of the Vertical Merger 1 
(Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/938236/download [https://perma.cc/ 
MU83-5RW4]. 
 88. Joe Cantlupe, New Scrutiny for Hospital Mergers, NEJM CATALYST (Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://catalyst.nejm.org/scrutiny-hospital-cross-market-mergers/ [https://perma.cc/X6HM-
R5C2]. 
 89. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 1. 
 90. Christine A. Varney, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines:  Evolution, Not 
Revolution, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 651 (2011). 
 91. In 2013, 1326 transactions were reported and reviewed under the HSR Act and thirty-
eight transactions were reviewed after the FTC or DOJ initiated independent action. Merger 
Review by the Numbers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/competition-matters/2014/05/merger-review-numbers [https://perma.cc/34N3-
F6RF] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 92. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 1. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. § 2.2. 
 95. Id. § 4.  
 96. Id.  The Supreme Court stated that “[t]he ‘area of effective competition’ must be 
determined by reference to a product market (the ‘line of commerce’) and a geographic market 
(the ‘section of the country’).” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).  
2484 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
relevant product market by offering similar services.97  Hospitals may 
compete in the relevant geographic market by offering health care to 
individuals in the same region or community.98  According to the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, market definition is centered on “customers’ ability and 
willingness to substitute away from one product to another in response to a 
price increase or a corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in 
product quality or service.”99  In the hospital context, the product and 
geographic markets are likely to intersect because the agencies want to 
determine whether patients will be able to receive comparable services and 
specialties without traveling far from home.100 
The agencies define the geographic and product markets by employing the 
“hypothetical monopolist test.”101  The test seeks to determine the smallest 
area in which a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a “small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in price” (SSNIP) for a given product 
or service.102  The geographic market consists of all hospitals where patients 
would be willing to seek care in response to a SSNIP at their preferred 
hospital.103  The agencies’ goal is to identify hospitals that are reasonably 
interchangeable with one of the merging hospitals.104 
2.  Market Share and Concentration 
Once the hypothetical monopolist test defines the relevant market, the 
agencies can evaluate the merging parties’ market share and the effect of the 
merger on market concentration.105  The agencies seek to analyze market 
shares and concentration in a narrowly defined market under the hypothetical 
monopolist test because a narrow market best allows the agencies to assess 
whether the proposed merger will likely substantially lessen competition.106 
A hospital’s market share is defined by its percentage of patient discharges 
in the relevant market.107  The market shares of all the hospitals in the 
 
 97. See, e.g., FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 468 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(“[T]he parties here agree that the product market here is . . . inpatient general acute care 
services—specifically, those services sold to commercial health plans and their members.”).  
 98. See, e.g., id. at 470 (noting that “because most patients prefer to go to nearby hospitals, 
there are often only a few hospitals in a geographic market”). 
 99. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 4.  
 100. See Amy D. Paul, The Complexities of Hospital Merger Review, A.B.A., 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_ser
ies/complexities_of_hospital_merger_review.html [https://perma.cc/A2GE-LQDL] (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 101. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 4.1.1. 
 102. Id.; see also Lopatka, supra note 10, at 825. 
 103. Lopatka, supra note 10, at 825. 
 104. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 4.1.1. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. H.E. Frech III, James Langenfeld & R. Forrest McCluer, Elzinga-Hogarty Tests and 
Alternative Approaches for Market Share Calculations in Hospital Markets, 71 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 921, 935 (2004); see also James B. Albertson, Note, Hospital Antitrust:  The Merging 
Hospital and the Resulting Exposure to Antitrust Merger and Monopolization Laws, 24 
WASHBURN L.J. 300, 319 (1985).   
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relevant market are then used to determine whether the market is highly 
concentrated, moderately concentrated, or not concentrated.108 
Market concentration is calculated by summing the squares of each 
hospital’s market share.109  This figure is known as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI).110  For instance, if there are four hospitals in the 
relevant market, each with a 25 percent market share, then the calculation is 
252 + 252 + 252 + 252 = 2500.111  The HHI is first calculated using the 
hospitals’ market shares before the merger takes place and then again using 
the prospective market shares of the same hospitals postmerger.112  If two of 
the hospitals in the previous example merged, the postmerger calculation 
would be 502 + 252 + 252 = 3750.  The effect of the merger on market 
concentration is determined by comparing pre- and post-merger HHIs.113  
The greater the increase in HHI will be postmerger, the greater the agencies’ 
antitrust concerns will be.114 
The determination of the geographic market is extremely important 
because the merging parties’ postmerger market share, and thus market 
concentration, will be higher in a narrowly defined geographic market.  The 
agencies presume that mergers that significantly increase market 
concentration or result in a highly concentrated market increase the merging 
parties’ market power.115  The agencies seek to block these mergers because 
they presume that increased market power will lead to higher prices, reduced 
product quality and variety, reduced service, and diminished innovation.116 
3.  Defenses 
Once the agencies have determined that a merger will likely be 
anticompetitive, the parties may argue that the transaction should be allowed 
because competition will not be adversely affected, or that other benefits may 
result.117  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines identify several defenses that 
the agencies are likely to find persuasive.118  According to the Guidelines, 
the agencies will recognize the failing-firm defense when one of the parties 
is in imminent danger of failing, such that 
 
 108. Lopatka, supra note 10, at 826.   
 109. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 5.3.   
 110. Id.  An HHI below 1500 suggests that the market is not concentrated, while an HHI 
between 1500 and 2500 suggests that the market is moderately concentrated. Id.  An HHI 
above 2500 suggests the market is highly concentrated. Id.  
 111. See id. § 5.3 n.9.  
 112. Id. § 5.3.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. § 2.1.3.  An increase of more than 200 “will be presumed to be likely to enhance 
market power.” Id. § 5.3.  
 116. Id. § 1.  Increased market power is presumed to be anticompetitive because price is 
dependent upon supply and demand. See Price Maker, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pricemaker.asp [https://perma.cc/EN9Y-A3TK] (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2018).  With fewer competitors, companies have greater “control over the 
supply released into the market, allowing [them] to dictate prices.” Id.  
 117. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 2.1.3. 
 118. See id. §§ 8–11. 
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(1) the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial 
obligations in the near future; 
(2) it would not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Act; and 
(3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable 
alternative offers that would keep its tangible and intangible assets in the 
relevant market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the 
proposed merger.119 
The failing-firm defense may be successful when the parties can show the 
merger will not likely enhance market power because the assets of the failing 
firm will likely exit the relevant market absent a merger, which would ensure 
that consumers will not be harmed by the merger.120 
The existence of powerful buyers in the market may also weigh in favor of 
a merger.121  Although the presence of a powerful buyer does not eliminate 
anticompetitive effects, parties may argue that the buyer will be able to 
constrain prices following the merger.122  For instance, in FTC v. Sanford 
Health,123 the merging physician groups argued that Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of North Dakota was a powerful buyer and its presence in the market would 
limit their ability to raise prices postmerger.124 
Additionally, merging parties may argue that barriers to entry are low, such 
that the merger will not harm competition because increased prices will lead 
new firms to enter the market and entice consumers.125  In analyzing barrier-
to-entry claims, the agencies consider historical evidence of entry in the 
relevant market.126  According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, parties 
may pose a successful defense “if entry would be timely, likely, and sufficient 
in its magnitude, character, and scope to deter or counteract the competitive 
effects of concern.”127 
Merging parties can also argue that the merger will create efficiencies that 
will allow the merged firm to better compete, possibly resulting in lower 
prices, improved quality, or new products.128  There are several requirements 
that efficiency arguments must meet to be cognizable to the agencies.129  
Efficiencies must be merger-specific, verifiable, and must not arise from 
anticompetitive reductions in output or service.130  Merging parties must 
show the likelihood that each efficiency asserted will result, how and when 
each will be achieved, any costs associated with achieving the efficiencies, 
 
 119. Id. § 11.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. § 8. 
 122. Id. 
 123. No. 1:17-cv-00133, slip op. at 1 (D.N.D. Dec. 15, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-
3783 (8th Cir. Dec. 26, 2017). 
 124. Id. at 35–41. 
 125. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 9. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. § 10. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
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and how the efficiencies will enable the merged firm to compete more 
effectively.131  It may be difficult for merging parties to prove that beneficial 
efficiencies will result because there is no definitive proof of what will occur 
once the merger is consummated.132  Further, even if the merging parties can 
show that efficiencies will result, the agencies have the discretion to 
determine whether the efficiencies outweigh the potential harm.133 
D.  Courts Follow the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
If the agencies determine, upon weighing all the evidence, that a 
transaction will likely substantially lessen competition, they may seek to 
enjoin the merger.134  Courts apply different standards to mergers challenged 
by the FTC and DOJ because the agencies sue to enjoin mergers under 
different statutes.135 
Although it may seem that the burden of proof would be the same 
regardless of the agency bringing the suit, this is not true.  The FTC enjoys a 
lower burden of proof than is normally required in a preliminary-injunction 
hearing.136  The FTC Act provides that a preliminary injunction should be 
granted when the FTC has shown that upon “weighing the equities and 
considering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, [a preliminary 
injunction] would be in the public interest.”137  Courts have interpreted this 
statutory language as placing a lower burden of proof on the FTC because 
the statute uses a public interest standard, instead of the traditional equity 
standard.138  Courts give great deference to the FTC in preliminary-injunction 
hearings because, in conducting this balancing test, merging parties’ interests 
are not given much weight and often cannot outweigh the public interest in 
enforcing the antitrust laws.139 
The FTC initially has the burden of proving that a transaction will be 
anticompetitive.140  The FTC can meet its burden by proposing relevant 
geographic and product markets and showing that the merger will likely have 
 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.; see also Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdough, Information Problems in Merger 
Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 23, 28–30 (1993). 
 133. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 10. (“The greater the potential 
adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater must be the cognizable efficiencies, and 
the more they must be passed through to customers . . . .”); D. Daniel Sokol & James A. 
Fishkin, Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 
45, 56–57 (2011).  
 134. See supra Part I.B. 
 135. Goldfein & Keyte, supra note 76, at 1.  
 136. Id.  
 137. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2012). 
 138. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing FTC v. 
Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).  Unlike plaintiffs under the traditional 
equity standard, the FTC does not need to show a likelihood of irreparable harm or that private 
equities are subordinated to public equities. Id. at 1060 n.7. 
 139. See FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 352 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 140. Id. at 337 (citing Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 
Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 783 (9th Cir. 2015)). 
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anticompetitive effects within those markets.141  The relevant market should 
be defined in accordance with the hypothetical monopolist test.142  Once the 
relevant market is defined, the court will infer that a transaction will likely 
be anticompetitive if it will significantly increase market concentration or the 
merged firm’s market share.143 
Once the FTC has met its burden of proof, the burden shifts to the merging 
parties to rebut a presumption of anticompetitive effects.144  There are a few 
defenses that merging hospitals may employ to rebut a presumption of 
anticompetitive effects.145  Parties might argue that the FTC’s market is not 
well defined and that the market shares being considered are inaccurate 
because the relevant market is actually larger and has more competitors.146  
Parties can also argue that one of the defenses described in the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines applies.147  Specifically, parties might argue that the 
transaction will create efficiencies,148 the benefits of which outweigh any 
potential harm to competition.149 
Courts view the efficiency defense with skepticism.150  It has not been 
formally endorsed by most courts, including the Supreme Court, and the 
governing statute does not prescribe it.151  Thus, when courts analyze the 
sufficiency of efficiency claims, they often impose a very strict standard of 
proof.152 
 
 141. Id. at 337–38; FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 464, 467 (7th 
Cir. 2016). 
 142. Advocate Health, 841 F.3d at 464; Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 338; St. Luke’s 
Health, 778 F.3d at 784. 
 143. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 347 (finding that an increase in HHI over 200 and the 
merged parties’ likely high market share postmerger were sufficient to find the merger 
presumptively anticompetitive); ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 570 (6th 
Cir. 2014) (finding that the “strong correlation between market share and price, and the degree 
to which th[e] merger would further concentrate markets that are already highly 
concentrated . . . fully supports the Commission’s application of a presumption of illegality”).  
 144. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 337 (citing St. Luke’s Health, 778 F.3d at 783). 
 145. Matthew L. Cantor, Defending Hospital Mergers:  4 Antitrust Defenses, BECKER’S 
HOSP. REV. (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactions-
and-valuation/defending-hospital-mergers-4-antitrust-defenses.html [https://perma.cc/5TRF-
WUDM]. 
 146. Id.  
 147. See supra Part I.C.  
 148. This Note focuses on the efficiency defense.  
 149. Cantor, supra note 145; see also HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, 
§ 10. 
 150. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Possible economies cannot 
be used as a defense to illegality.”); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 
(1963) (finding that an anticompetitive merger cannot be saved because it may result in social 
or economic benefits); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344–45 (1962); FTC 
v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 347–48 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that a hospital 
merger that would allow the parties to better utilize their capacity did not justify allowing the 
presumptively anticompetitive transaction to be consummated); Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–
Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 788–92 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 151. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 348 (“Based on [the Supreme Court’s] language and 
on the Clayton Act’s silence on the issue, we are skeptical that such an efficiencies defense 
even exists.”). 
 152. Id. at 349 (citing St. Luke’s Health, 778 F.3d at 790; FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 
F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)).  It is difficult to know what standard of proof the agencies 
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No merging parties have yet prevailed before a circuit court by proving 
efficiencies sufficient to rebut a presumption of anticompetitive effects.153  
Yet most circuit courts have adopted at least some of the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines’ requirements for successfully proving efficiencies.  In 2016, the 
Third Circuit adopted four requirements from the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines:  merging parties must show that efficiencies (1) will “offset the 
anticompetitive concerns in highly concentrated markets,” (2) are “merger 
specific,” (3) are “verifiable, not speculative,” and (4) “must not arise from 
anticompetitive reductions in output or service.”154  The Eleventh Circuit 
recognizes the last three requirements but only credits arguments for price-
related efficiencies.155  The D.C. Circuit requires that merging parties prove 
“extraordinary efficiencies” that are merger-specific.156 
E.  Cross-Market Mergers May Increase 
Hospitals’ Bargaining Power 
The FTC and courts have not yet considered the effects of cross-market 
mergers—mergers between firms that compete in different markets—in their 
analyses of horizontal hospital mergers.157  This Part explains how cross-
market give some hospitals increased bargaining power for some hospitals.  
Because of the unique way that hospitals must market their products to health 
insurers (i.e., payers), cross-market merged hospitals enjoy greater 
competitive strength, despite potentially occupying a smaller share of the 
market. 
To date, the FTC has not sought to enjoin a cross-market health-care 
merger:  a merger between two hospitals that offer services to patients in 
separate and distinct markets.158  This may be because it is assumed that 
parties do not have increased bargaining power unless there is less 
 
actually require because their investigations remain confidential. Mergers, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/ 
mergers [https://perma.cc/Z93U-E7B6] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 153. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 154. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 348–49. 
 155. St. Luke’s Health, 778 F.3d at 791–92 (“[T]he district court concluded that St. Luke’s 
might provide better service to patients after the merger.  That is a laudable goal, but the 
Clayton Act does not excuse mergers that lessen competition or create monopolies simply 
because the merged entity can improve its operations.”); Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette 
Durrance & D. Daniel Sokol, Hospital Mergers and Economic Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REV. 
1, 54–55 (2016). 
 156. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Univ. Health, 938 
F.2d at 1223). 
 157. David A. Argue & Lona Fowdur, An Examination of New Theories on Price Effects 
of Cross-Market Hospital Mergers 6 (unpublished manuscript), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c909/cc1194b13cda18059ec26d85a2c4f1623b00.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M6M5-Y2TT] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 158. See Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, The Price Effects of Cross-Market 
Hospital Mergers 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22106, 2017).  As 
of this writing, the DOJ has challenged the cross-market merger of Time Warner and AT&T, 
possibly marking a change in the agencies’ policy toward cross-market mergers.  Cecilia Kang 
& Michael J. de la Merced, U.S. Sues to Stop AT&T’s Takeover of Time Warner, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 21, 2017, at A1.  
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competition in the market.159  Additionally, the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines and the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines both fail to explain to 
practitioners or agency staff how to evaluate these types of mergers.160 
As previously discussed, agencies and courts are willing to assume that a 
transaction will have anticompetitive effects if the merger increases market 
concentration or the merged firm’s market share.161  This is likely because 
historical evidence shows that mergers that increase market concentration 
and the merged firm’s market share cause higher prices due to increased 
bargaining power.162  Moreover, evidence suggests that cross-market 
hospital mergers lead to increased prices due to increased bargaining power.  
Economists have recently begun to analyze price increases resulting from 
cross-market mergers to understand how and why this may be occurring.  
This Part discusses three models that have been used to analyze cross-market 
price increases and economists’ theories as to why price increases occur.  Part 
I.E.1 explains the employer-choice model.  Part I.E.2 then describes the 
common-customers model. Finally, Part I.E.3 explains the health-plan-
pricing model. 
1.  The Employer-Choice Model 
Gregory Vistnes and Yanis Sarafidis were two of the first economists to 
study cross-market mergers and the effect they may have on prices.163  
Because health-care providers must compete for both patients and inclusion 
in payers’ health plans,164 Vistnes and Sarafidis suggest that even if patients 
do not view two hospitals as substitutes for one another, anticompetitive 
effects may still occur if payers view the hospitals as substitutes.165 
Payers compete on two levels.166  First, because most Americans receive 
health insurance through their employer or a family member’s employer, 
payers must compete to have employers offer their health plans to 
employees.167  Second, payers compete to be chosen by employees who are 
offered a choice of more than one health plan.168 
 
 159. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 158, at 2. 
 160. David A. Argue & Scott D. Stein, Cross-Market Health Care Provider Mergers:  The 
Next Enforcement Frontier, 30 ANTITRUST 25, 25 (2015) (“[T]hey do not raise concerns under 
the competitive effects analysis of the [Horizontal Merger] Guidelines because the providers 
would not be viewed as substitutes.”). 
 161. See supra Parts I.C–D. 
 162. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.  
 163. See Gregory Vistnes & Yanis Sarafidis, Cross-Market Hospital Mergers:  A Holistic 
Approach, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 258 (2013). 
 164. Argue & Stein, supra note 160, at 25.  
 165. Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 163, at 260.  
 166. Id. at 266; Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 673 (2000).  
 167. Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 163, at 265–66.  
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may live and work in various geographic markets. Id.  The number of plans offered to 
employees varies with the size of the firm. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & 
EDUC. TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS:  2017 ANNUAL SURVEY 66 (2017).  In 2017, 
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Payers’ health plans primarily compete based on the health-care providers 
from which members can receive care,169 such as hospitals, physicians, and 
ancillary care providers.170  Because payers need to include the maximum 
number of providers in their network to remain competitive with other 
payers, merged firms may enjoy greater bargaining power because the loss 
of two hospitals will have a much greater effect on the payer’s ability to 
compete than the loss of one hospital.171 
Before a merger occurs, if a hospital attempts to increase its price, the 
payer can threaten to drop the hospital from its network and steer its members 
to another hospital.172  If patients view two hospitals as substitutes for one 
another (as identified by the hypothetical monopolist test), then the health 
plan will retain power to constrain prices.173  If patients are willing to seek 
care from other hospitals in the payer’s network, then the health plan will not 
be affected if it fails to contract with one.174 
Vistnes and Sarafidis suggest that, because payers seek to sell their plans 
to employers whose employees live and work in various geographic markets, 
the most attractive health plans are those with the fewest holes in their 
network.175  Cross-market mergers allow the merged hospitals to threaten 
payers with more holes in the various markets in which the ultimate 
customers may live.176  The more holes a plan has, the less likely it is that 
employers will choose to offer that health plan to their employees.177  Even 
if the employer did offer the health plan, employees may be more likely to 
use a different plan that has fewer holes in the geographic market where they 
seek care.  Because payers depend so heavily on the inclusion of hospitals in 
their health plans, hospital systems garner increased bargaining power to 
raise rates.178 
 
approximately 71 percent of large employers (with 5000 workers or more) gave their 
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were less likely to offer more than one health plan. Id. 
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visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
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2.  The Common-Customers Model 
In 2016, Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho, and Robin S. Lee published a study 
using the common-customers model to demonstrate why prices increase 
following cross-market mergers.179  The common-customers model is a 
variation of the employer-choice model.180  Under this model, insurers 
compete for “customers who in turn may aggregate the preferences of 
multiple individuals,” such as employees or households.181  The study shows 
that when two merging hospitals are valued by a common customer, price 
increases may result.182 
Dafny, Ho, and Lee suggest that common customers will generally buy a 
bundle of provider services from payers.183  For instance, employers may 
seek a bundle of providers in two geographic markets where their employees 
reside, and families may seek a bundle of adult and pediatric hospitals.184  
The authors suggest that the common customer’s preference for a cross-
market bundle leads to the elimination of a competitor and increased 
bargaining power for the hospital system.185 
3.  The Health-Plan-Pricing Model 
Vistnes and Sarafidis hypothesize that another reason prices increase 
following cross-market mergers is that payers typically charge the same price 
to all of an employer’s employees, regardless of where they live.186  If a payer 
offers its health plan to an employer whose employees live in different 
geographic markets and the employees have a choice of more than one plan, 
the payer must adjust its pricing based on any holes that exist in the 
geographic markets where the employees live.187  These price adjustments 
must be made after analyzing how the price changes will affect the plan’s 
profits in all of its markets, not just those with holes.188 
If payers marketed their health plans separately for each market, they 
would likely charge less in markets with holes and maintain a competitive 
price in markets without them.189  However, because payers charge the same 
price to all employees regardless of where they seek care, the payer must set 
a compromise price.190  Payers cannot price their plans too low based on the 
existing holes or they would lose profits in the markets without holes.191  The 
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compromise price will likely be set between the desired prices for a market 
with holes and a market without holes.192 
This pricing practice provides cross-market merged hospital systems with 
increased bargaining power for two reasons.  First, insurers will suffer 
incremental losses in profit as the number of holes in their networks 
increase.193  Second, the health plan’s profits will decline even in markets 
without any holes because of the lowered price across the plan.194 
II.  SHOULD HEALTH-CARE PROVIDERS’ 
EFFICIENCY ARGUMENTS BE GIVEN GREATER WEIGHT? 
There is much debate over whether the agencies and courts should give 
greater weight to efficiency arguments presented by merging health-care 
providers.195  On the one hand, mergers may produce efficiencies that benefit 
consumers, such as cost savings that can be passed on, clinical 
standardization that can improve patient care, and utilization of capacity at 
two locations that allows for better management of care.196  On the other 
hand, research differs on whether these efficiencies actually occur 
postmerger.197 
This Part discusses the relevant issues in the debate of whether efficiency 
arguments should be given more weight.  Part II.A discusses how the 
efficiency defense has evolved in the various revisions of the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines.  Part II.B then provides arguments in favor of expanding 
the efficiency defense.  Next, Part II.C discusses arguments against 
expanding the efficiency defense.  Lastly, Part II.D examines common 
efficiency arguments that merging hospitals present in court and the grounds 
on which they typically fail. 
A.  The Efficiency Defense’s Increasing Importance 
The agencies first incorporated the efficiency defense in the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines in 1968.198  Contrary to prior decisions by the Supreme 
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Court,199 the Guidelines suggested that exceptional efficiencies could justify 
a merger that would normally be subject to challenge.200  However, for years, 
the agencies did not give much, if any, credit to efficiency arguments. 
In 1982, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines made it easier for the agencies 
to show that a merger was likely to be anticompetitive; at the same time, they 
made it more difficult for merging parties to prove efficiencies sufficient to 
overcome the presumption of anticompetitive effects.201  The Guidelines 
lowered the burden of proof in response to concerns about the connection 
between concentration and the exercise of market power.202  It became 
evident that if a single firm exercised control over the majority of a product’s 
supply, that firm would also be able to control the output of such product, 
increasing demand and price.203  However, this standard of proof was short 
lived. 
Due to fears that mergers, which could produce efficiencies that would 
enable firms to compete more effectively on a global scale, would be 
prohibited under the previous standard, the agencies began to refrain from 
blocking some mergers.204  As a result, the agencies updated the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines to reflect a more nuanced approach.205  In 1984, the 
agencies recognized that postmerger efficiencies could increase overall 
competition and lead to lower prices for consumers.206 
Since then, the efficiency defense has become more highly valued, with 
the FTC noting that several agency investigations have been resolved in favor 
of efficiencies that benefit competition.207  However, even after these 
changes, it remains very difficult for merging parties to prevail in court by 
proving efficiencies sufficient to outweigh findings of potential 
anticompetitive harms.208 
B.  Why Courts Should Consider Merger Efficiencies 
There are several arguments for crediting merging parties’ efficiency 
arguments.  First, there may be a benefit to consumers and the general public 
that outweighs any detriment to competition or price.209  Mergers between 
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inefficiently small firms may increase competition by creating a more 
efficient firm.210  If two firms are unable to compete effectively with larger 
players in the market, then allowing the merger may actually increase 
competition and lead to lower prices.211  Additionally, efficiencies, which 
could increase patient outcomes and the quality of care, may result from 
mergers between health-care providers.212  The benefits of increased quality 
may outweigh any anticompetitive effects, such as price increases. 
Second, the statutory language and legislative history of the antitrust laws 
do not suggest that Congress intended for the agencies or courts to disregard 
merger efficiencies.213  In fact, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States214 that Congress, in amending the Clayton Act, did 
not intend for the antitrust laws to block “a merger between two small 
companies to enable the combination to compete more effectively with larger 
corporations dominating the relevant market.”215  This suggests that 
Congress was open to the idea that efficiencies may weigh in favor of a 
transaction.  The Supreme Court did not ultimately rely on this legislative 
history and instead found that Congress favored competition over 
efficiencies.216 
Third, the conceptualization of efficiency arguments as a defense is a 
mischaracterization.217  Efficiency arguments are a defense to a prima facie 
showing of anticompetitive effects.218  Yet, efficiencies should nonetheless 
be considered an integral part of the determination of whether a merger will 
lessen competition in the first place.219  Efficiencies play a crucial role in 
competition.  They can drive competition because increased quality by one 
party will incentivize its competitors to match or exceed that quality.220 
C.  Why Courts Should Remain Skeptical of Efficiency Arguments 
There are also several arguments for why agencies and courts should not 
credit merging parties’ efficiency arguments.  One reason the presumption of 
anticompetitive effects should remain difficult to overcome, especially in the 
health-care context, is that price increases can have an outsized effect on 
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consumers.221  Additionally, unscrambling a consummated health-care 
merger that later proves to be harmful is very difficult.222 
In 1976, Judge Richard Posner vehemently rejected the idea that courts 
should analyze merger efficiencies.223  He argued that presumptively 
anticompetitive mergers should only be allowed when there is evidence that 
the acquiring or acquired firm effectively lacks the ability to compete.224  In 
these instances, market-share and concentration figures would be inaccurate 
representations of the competitive landscape for those firms.225  He reasoned 
that evaluation of efficiencies by courts would be intractable to deal with in 
litigation, estimates of cost savings would be difficult to weigh against the 
monopoly costs of the merger, and any expenditures made in the process of 
seeking merger approval would likely dissipate any cost savings that could 
be achieved.226 
Empirical evidence varies as to whether efficiencies actually occur 
postmerger.227  Some research suggests that mergers may lead to higher costs 
and less efficiency and innovation due to reduced competition.228  Former 
FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, quoting the former director of the FTC 
Bureau of Economics, stated that “the cost of an average inpatient stay at a 
hospital that faces no competition is almost $1,900 higher than those where 
there are at least four competitors, which results in higher premiums that get 
passed on to consumers.”229  Other evidence suggests that a hospital system’s 
size does not correlate with cost.230  Because there is no clear evidence that 
mergers lead to efficiencies, it is difficult to evaluate whether the efficiencies 
claimed by merging parties will counteract anticompetitive effects or produce 
benefits that offset price increases. 
There are several hypotheses for why health-care mergers might fail to 
realize efficiencies.  First, merged facilities often continue to operate 
separately and, thus, fail to benefit from the cost savings of integrating their 
administrative services.231  Second, hospital systems fail to implement 
system-wide standards.232  Third, cost synergies are not the focus of many 
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mergers.233  Fourth, executives of the merging firms are often focused on 
closing the deal rather than integrating the hospitals.234 
D.  Hospitals’ Efficiency Arguments Typically 
Fail at the Circuit Court Level 
One requirement, imposed by the agencies in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines and adopted by several courts, is that efficiencies must be merger-
specific to rebut a presumption of anticompetitive effects.235  As such, certain 
efficiency arguments are likely to fail because the benefits could be obtained 
through other means, such as contractual arrangements between the parties 
or a third party who is not a competitor.236 
Parties often argue that merging will reduce costs by eliminating 
duplicative services, such as surplus administrative personnel.237  Since each 
separate hospital will have an administrative office that conducts nonclinical 
tasks, such as billing, finance, credentialing, and procurement, a merger may 
reduce headcount by allowing these offices to be consolidated.238  The 
resulting savings could be passed on to patients by investing in new or 
improved services or discounts.239  However, these arguments are likely to 
fail because the cost savings could be achieved through contractual 
arrangements and, therefore, are not merger-specific.240 
Parties may also argue that savings will be generated through postmerger 
standardization of purchasing medical supplies241 and information 
technology (IT) systems.242  Hospitals often participate in at least one group 
purchasing organization (GPO), through which they secure discounts on 
supplies and equipment.243  However, hospitals will often be able to receive 
better deals by negotiating with suppliers directly if they purchase a 
substantial volume of goods.244  Because a hospital operating on its own 
likely does not require a large quantity of goods, it may be unable to reap the 
benefits of direct negotiating or to access the best GPO-provided 
discounts.245  A merger may allow parties to negotiate for better rates on 
supplies and provide them with the ability to store and distribute supplies 
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more efficiently.246  IT systems for electronic medical records operate in the 
same way.  Mergers may allow hospital systems to share these expensive 
systems, which are likely to generate cost savings that may be passed on.247  
Because these cost savings can result from contractual arrangements between 
parties, such efficiency arguments typically fail.248 
Another requirement that creates difficulties for merging parties is that 
efficiencies must be verifiable, not speculative.249  Hospitals may argue that 
merging will allow them to share their best practices and clinical protocols, 
thereby improving patient care.250  Clinical standardization can, in theory, 
similarly reduce costs and produce better quality.251  If physicians are better 
able to identify avoidable complications in outlier patients, there may be 
improvements in the quality of care and patient outcomes.252  However, 
because quality is not a set standard, it is very difficult for parties to prove 
that quality improvements will result.253 
Hospital mergers may also enable parties to utilize excess capacity at one 
hospital and alleviate capacity constraints at another, which allows the 
constrained party to avoid a capital expenditure.254  For instance, the 
acquiring hospital may not have sufficient capacity to house all of its patients, 
especially if it is an academic medical center (AMC) with a strong 
reputation.255  At the same time, community medical centers often 
underutilize their capacity.256  By combining the two, the community hospital 
can take over the care of patients requiring less complex procedures, and the 
AMC can focus on high-end services.257  A merger between two such 
hospitals may generate capital savings by allowing the AMC to avoid 
building new facilities.258  These savings can then be passed on to consumers 
through investments in new service lines, equipment, and building 
renovations that will allow the hospitals to run more smoothly.259  In 
asserting this defense in court, however, parties must prove that the efficiency 
will be achieved, is merger-specific, and will not result in an anticompetitive 
reduction in output.260 
In FTC v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center,261 the parties argued that 
the proposed merger would relieve the acquiring hospital’s capacity 
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constraints.262  However, the circuit court rejected this argument and found 
that the merger would have the anticompetitive effect of making it 
unnecessary for one party to build a new bed tower that would increase 
output.263  The parties argued that the acquiring hospital, Penn State Hershey 
Medical Center (“Hershey”), was overly constrained and struggling to find a 
solution to its capacity problems.264  The Hershey board of directors had been 
considering a proposal to build a new bed tower, which would cost $277 
million.265  However, these plans were not yet finalized or approved by the 
board, and they would have taken a long time to implement.266  The hospital 
that Hershey sought to acquire, PinnacleHealth System (“Pinnacle”), had 
excess capacity.267  The district court found that the merger would create 
efficiencies sufficient to rebut any presumption of anticompetitive effects, if 
found.268  However, the Third Circuit found that “Hershey’s ability to forego 
building the 100-bed tower” would be an anticompetitive reduction in 
services that would not justify allowing the merger to occur.269 
III.  GREATER WEIGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO 
HOSPITALS’ POSSIBLE POSTMERGER EFFICIENCIES 
This Note proposes that the agencies and courts should give greater weight 
to health-care merger efficiencies.  The possibility that mergers between 
health-care providers may lead to quality improvements that can benefit 
patients is worth the risk of increased prices.  Although higher prices are 
undesirable, the possibility of improved patient outcomes should justify price 
increases.  Various government agencies have placed monetary values on 
human life exceeding $8 million per life.270  Although the FTC has not set a 
monetary value on life, assuming the value of life is above $8 million 
suggests that certain price increases at merged hospitals may be justified 
when there is a reasonable probability that lives will be saved due to merger 
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[https://perma.cc/9KD8-9BWL].  The Department of Agriculture values an individual human 
life at $8.9 million, the Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human 
Services value life at $9.5 million, and the Environmental Protection Agency values life at $10 
million. Id.  These values are used by these agencies to determine whether the benefits of 
proposed regulations outweigh their costs. Id.  
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efficiencies.271  Additionally, when viewed from the perspective of the 
consumer, the possibility of saving the life of a family member or neighbor 
may be priceless. 
Allowing hospitals to merge based on efficiency arguments may increase 
the number of lives saved.272  This is a more important goal than reducing 
price.  Though not all mergers will result in saved lives, it is too difficult to 
determine when life-saving efficiencies will be generated.273  The agencies 
and courts should be willing to accept efficiency arguments at a lower 
standard than is currently present because the possibility that lives will be 
saved is a risk worth taking. 
The current Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the courts’ interpretation of 
the Guidelines present too high a hurdle and likely block mergers that could 
have great benefits to patient quality, outcomes, and care.274  Although it is 
difficult to know for certain how the agencies are interpreting the 
requirements laid out in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,275 it is possible 
to analyze the way that courts view merging parties’ efficiency arguments.276 
This Part argues that the burden of proof courts place upon merging health-
care providers to prove efficiencies is too high.277  The Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines outline requirements that courts should continue to rely upon.278  
However, in doing so, courts should lower the standard for these 
requirements and refrain from blocking mergers between hospitals and other 
health-care providers where efficiencies may plausibly result.  Part III.A 
explains how courts should interpret the requirements of the efficiency 
defense.  Part III.B then proposes a new efficiency argument based on the 
effects of cross-market mergers that agencies and courts should consider in 
analyzing mergers’ effects on competition. 
A.  There Should Be a Lower Standard for 
Proving Health-Care Merger Efficiencies 
Parties who have undergone agency investigations and choose to argue 
their case in court likely believe there are compelling reasons that their 
 
 271. For instance, if prices increase by $24 million following a merger, this merger may be 
justified if at least three lives are saved.  Because increased costs are diluted among those 
seeking care in the geographic market, each person’s increase in price may contribute to the 
merging hospitals’ abilities to save lives.  
 272. See generally NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17 (discussing the benefits of hospital 
mergers). 
 273. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 274. Since 2008, the FTC’s actions have led to the abandonment of six hospital mergers. 
David J. Balan, Hospital Mergers That Don’t Happen, NEJM CATALYST (Oct. 24, 2016), 
https://catalyst.nejm.org/hospital-mergers-dont-happen/ [https://perma.cc/2CKZ-RWNM]. 
 275. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra Parts I.D, II.D. 
 277. This Note does not take a stance on the standard that should be applied in analyzing 
efficiencies that may result from mergers in other industries.  This Note argues specifically 
that agencies and courts should lower the standard for health-care providers because of the 
high likelihood that efficiencies will benefit life and health.   
 278. See supra Part I.C. 
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mergers should not be enjoined.279  The overly simplistic treatment of the 
efficiency defense by courts suggests that courts may be uncomfortable 
analyzing merger efficiencies.280  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines were 
updated in 2010 to cure biases that undervalued efficiencies, yet courts often 
make up their minds about a transaction without giving efficiency arguments 
much weight or attention.281 
The Supreme Court, in three cases, expressed its hesitance to accept 
arguments that efficiencies generated from a merger could overcome a 
presumption of anticompetitive effects.282  Courts have latched onto the 
language of these cases and remain skeptical of efficiency arguments because 
of the precedent set by the Supreme Court.283  The precedent that courts 
continue to rely on, however, is from the 1960s, when the efficiency defense 
was first introduced in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and there was 
strong hesitancy to accept any type of efficiency defense.284 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have continued to evolve.285  Today, 
efficiency arguments are credited by agencies in their investigatory review of 
mergers,286 but courts remain hesitant because they rely on an outdated 
ideology.287  Courts have expressed a willingness to allow a merger that will 
result in “extraordinary efficiencies,” yet no court has ever ratified a 
transaction on this basis.288  As the law stands, it is unclear what constitutes 
an extraordinary efficiency.  Going forward, courts need to be aware of the 
role that efficiencies have played in antitrust merger review and how that role 
has developed.  Without understanding the evolution of the efficiency 
defense, courts cannot understand that they are relying on outdated 
precedents. 
Although precedent is obviously important in the American common law 
system, judicial interpretations of laws have developed over time in many 
fields in response to changing social ideology, new empirical evidence, and 
more.289  Similar to other areas of law, the antitrust laws should be interpreted 
as a fluid body of law that must adapt with the times.  Because of the possible 
 
 279. Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 155, at 58. 
 280. Id.  
 281. Id. at 58–59.  
 282. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967); United States v. Phila. Nat’l 
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
 283. See, e.g., FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 347–48 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 284. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra Part II.A. 
 286. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra text accompanying note 284. 
 288. Penn State Hershey, 838 F.3d at 347; Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa Inc. v. St. 
Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 790 (9th Cir. 2015); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 
708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223–24 (11th 
Cir. 1991). 
 289. See Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673, 684 (2015) 
(noting that “extant law becomes risibly maladapted to the relevant problems as the policy 
environment changes over time”).  See generally, e.g., Emma Green, Gay Marriage Is Now a 
Constitutional Right in the United States of America, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/gay-marriage-legal-in-the-united-
states-of-america/396947/ [https://perma.cc/3LXV-CJNA]. 
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benefits to patients from hospital mergers,290 courts should value parties’ 
efficiency arguments more heavily.  Part III.A.1 argues that efficiencies 
should only be discredited for failing to be merger-specific when perfect 
substitutes exist.  Part III.A.2 contends that courts and agencies should not 
require proof that efficiencies will result.  Part III.A.3 discusses the error in 
the Third Circuit’s decision in Penn State Hershey and argues that 
anticompetitive reductions in output should only be found when the current 
output will be decreased, not when failure to achieve an increase in output 
may occur. 
1.  Alternatives to Merger-Specific Efficiencies 
Should Be Perfect Substitutes 
As discussed previously, courts require efficiencies, especially cost-saving 
efficiencies, to be merger-specific.291  However, the standard for hospital 
mergers is currently very high.292  Parties are often unable to prevail on 
efficiency arguments when other contractual arrangements could be utilized 
instead.293  However, efficiencies from contractual arrangements are not 
perfect substitutes for the efficiencies that could be gained from a merger.294 
Many hospital leaders believe that efficiencies will not be as extensive or 
durable if sought through looser affiliation agreements, for several possible 
reasons:  (1) “[l]ack of accountability and long-term commitment,” 
(2) “[i]nability to align incentives sufficiently to make the difficult choices 
necessary to substantially improve the efficiency of care delivery,” 
(3) “[a]cquirers’ unwillingness to invest substantial capital without 
commitment for the returns on the investment,” (4) “[l]egal or regulatory 
prohibitions on sharing financial information as well as detailed clinical 
information,” (5) “[r]eluctance to share valuable intellectual property with a 
loose affiliate,” and (6) “[f]ailure to create a common culture.”295 
Requiring that efficiencies be merger-specific to rebut a presumption of 
anticompetitive effects makes sense.  It would be preferable and generate the 
most benefits if efficiencies could be achieved without reducing competition.  
However, the idea that contractual arrangements may have the same long-
term effects as a merger neglects the realities of the health-care industry.  
Because hospital executives fear that contractual arrangements will be short 
term, they are not likely to invest any savings in future care and innovation.296  
If the parties believe the arrangement is only temporary, any savings are 
 
 290. See generally NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17 (discussing possible postmerger 
benefits to patients). 
 291. See supra Parts I.D, II.D. 
 292. See Part II.D for a discussion of the arguments that parties typically pose in support 
of a merger and why they fail in court.  
 293. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 294. NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17, at 10–11. 
 295. Id. at 10. 
 296. See id. at 11. 
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likely to be maintained and protected, not reinvested in service 
improvements.297 
Even if a contractual arrangement could produce the efficiencies in the 
short term, courts also need to realize the benefits of long-term solutions.  
Long-term solutions likely give hospital executives the confidence to reinvest 
cost savings.298  The lasting result of efficiencies from long-term solutions 
should be crucial to the analysis of whether there is a lessening of 
competition.  The FTC has argued that contractual arrangements are 
sufficient to have the same effect and at least one court has agreed.299  
Contracts may have the same effect in the short term, but the benefit of a 
merger is that the effect will last in the long term.  Savings are typically 
greater over a longer period of time and more likely to benefit patients.300 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that agencies will not discount 
efficiency arguments when there is a “less restrictive alternative that is 
merely theoretical.”301  Similarly, courts should evaluate the real-life 
practicality of substitutes that may create efficiencies without the proposed 
merger.  Courts should look beyond the theoretical possibility that another 
arrangement could create the same efficiencies and only discount efficiency 
arguments on merger-specificity grounds when there is proof that another 
arrangement will create the exact benefits that the merger will produce.  A 
close substitute should not be enough. 
2.  Parties Should Not Be Required to Verify Efficiencies 
When the FTC seeks to prove that a hospital merger will be 
anticompetitive, it may show, despite uncertainty, that a merger is likely to 
be anticompetitive because the merged firm will have a higher market share 
or the market will be more concentrated.302  The FTC does not need to show 
anticompetitive effects will, in fact, occur, only that they are likely.303  
However, merging parties’ efficiency arguments must be verifiable—an 
unfairly high standard.304 
 
 297. See id. 
 298. See id. 
 299. Id. at 10; Oliver & Leibenluft, supra note 7, at 21.  The district court in St. Luke’s 
discounted the parties’ arguments that the ability to share the cost of transitioning to an 
electronic patient record system was a merger-specific efficiency.  The court found the 
efficiencies claimed could not rebut the presumption of anticompetitive effects because the 
efficiencies could be achieved through another method. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa 
Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., No. 1:12-CV-00560-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *23 (D. 
Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 300. See NOETHER & MAY, supra note 17, at 12–13. 
 301. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 10. 
 302. See supra Part I.D.   
 303. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 304. See Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 348 
(2011) (“[M]erger law implicitly requires a greater degree of predictive proof of merger-
generated efficiencies than it does of merger-generated social costs.”). 
2504 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
It is very difficult to verify efficiency claims, especially those relating to 
quality improvements.305  First, there is little historical data on quality 
measures.306  Second, there are varying opinions as to what constitutes best 
practices, which make it unclear how sharing practices will be beneficial.307  
Third, this benefit is not necessarily merger-specific and could be 
accomplished merely by discussing best-care practices with consultants.308  
Lastly, there is conflicting evidence on whether mergers lead to improved 
quality.309  Thus, efficiency arguments often are very difficult to prove.310 
Because research and evidence remain split on whether mergers truly 
generate efficiencies, especially efficiencies affecting quality, courts have 
remained hesitant to credit efficiency arguments.311  Yet it is unlikely that 
economists and practitioners will ever agree on what constitutes a quality 
increase, how to measure one, and how to identify a quality-adjusted price 
postmerger.  Amid debates over what constitutes quality, it is unreasonably 
difficult for merging parties to prove that quality efficiencies will result.  
Thus, in evaluating efficiency claims, courts need to lower the burden of 
proof on the efficiency defense.  Courts should instead evaluate whether the 
efficiencies asserted are plausible. 
It is too difficult to know what will happen following a merger.  This is 
why the agencies must only show that a presumption of anticompetitive 
effects is likely.  It is unfair to require that merging parties anticipate and 
convince the court of what will occur postmerger when they have no ability 
to know what will happen.  Although merging parties are in the best position 
to make the claimed efficiencies happen, there needs to be some trust by 
courts that health-care providers will seek to provide the best quality of care 
to their patients.  Merging parties have great incentive to do so because they 
need to recruit and maintain patients and health plans.  Poor patient outcomes 
may result in press nightmares and loss of their patient base.312 
3.  The Flaw in Penn State Hershey:  Reductions in Output 
Should Only Be Considered from Current Levels 
The Third Circuit in Penn State Hershey correctly recognized that the 
efficiencies, which would have been created by allowing Hershey to use 
 
 305. There is no standard dictating how to measure quality of health care. CONG. RESEARCH 
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Pinnacle’s excess capacity, were merger-specific.313  Hershey had proposed 
building a new one-hundred-bed tower to alleviate its capacity constraint.314  
Even though the bed tower was a nonmerger remedy that was available to the 
parties, the court correctly found the efficiencies were merger-specific 
because the efficiencies that would have been generated by building the bed 
tower in the absence of the merger would not have been realized in the same 
way.315  Building the bed tower would have been more expensive and time 
consuming, while the merger efficiencies could have been achieved much 
faster.316 
Instead, the Third Circuit erred in finding that the merger would lead to an 
anticompetitive reduction in output.317  The district court found convincing 
evidence that the merger would alleviate capacity constraints and refrained 
from questioning the business judgment of the Hershey officers who testified 
that, without the merger, the bed tower would be necessary.318  However, on 
appeal, the Third Circuit found that the “evidence [was] ambiguous at best 
that Hershey needed to construct a 100-bed tower to alleviate its capacity 
constraints.”319  The court then went on to find that “Hershey’s ability to 
forego building the 100-bed tower [would be] a reduction in output.”320  Yet 
the court failed to explain why this would be a reduction in output.  It seems 
that the court confused output and capacity.  The court seemingly viewed this 
as a choice between (1) no bed tower (i.e., no expansion) and (2) building a 
new bed tower (i.e., expansion).  The court ruled in favor of expansion based 
on its belief that if Hershey did not expand its facilities, it would be reducing 
its output.321 
This view is wholly misguided and makes little sense.  First, the court 
found that Hershey did not need to increase its capacity.322  Second, the court 
found that Hershey could not merge because doing so would lessen its 
expansion and result in fewer patients being served.323  This is simply not 
true.  Hershey sought to increase its output postmerger by allowing for more 
patients to be cared for and housed at the acquired hospital, Pinnacle.324 
Additionally, the court assumed that without the merger, the bed tower 
would be built.325  However, many factors could have stymied Hershey’s 
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2506 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
plan to build a new bed tower.  For instance, the board of directors could have 
refused to approve the $277 million capital expenditure project.326 
Here, the court made up its mind without seriously analyzing the parties’ 
efficiency arguments.327  It realized that the efficiencies that could be derived 
from creating a new bed tower were not a substitute for the immediate 
solution the merger could provide to alleviate Hershey’s capacity-constraint 
problem.328  Thus, the court needed some ground on which to discount the 
parties’ efficiency arguments, and the requirement that efficiencies not 
reduce output was a viable excuse.329  The court then went on to add a 
catchall by stating that the merger was so likely to be anticompetitive that 
only “extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies” could rebut the 
presumption of anticompetitive effects.330  Apparently, the Third Circuit did 
not consider alleviating capacity constraints and increasing the hospital’s 
ability to provide care an extraordinary efficiency.331 
Courts need to engage in a deeper analysis of parties’ efficiency 
arguments.  Proposals to solve capacity constraints, in lieu of a merger that 
would also solve those issues, cannot be deemed certain to occur.  Finding 
that the proposed merger would render another viable option unnecessary 
should not be a ground for discrediting an efficiency.  If courts continue to 
do so, parties, like Hershey, who are pursuing a merger, may be deterred from 
simultaneously considering alternative capacity-constraint solutions.  If 
parties wait to find alternative solutions and the court enjoins their proposed 
merger, the process for finding alternative solutions will take much more 
time.  The capacity issues the parties already face might not be resolved as 
quickly, causing patients to suffer. 
B.  Agencies and Courts Should Consider Cross-Market 
Merger Effects in Evaluating Horizontal Mergers 
As discussed in Part I.E, one way in which hospitals compete is for 
inclusion in health insurance plans.332  A hospital’s bargaining power in this 
exchange is essential to competition.  Yet the agencies and courts do not 
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currently consider how different parties’ bargaining powers affect 
competition in the market.333  This may be because the agencies and courts 
assume that parties’ market shares are an accurate reflection of their 
bargaining power.  However, as the research by Vistnes and Sarafidis, and 
Dafny, Ho, and Lee, suggests, cross-market merged firms may have 
substantial bargaining power in markets where their market share is not very 
high.334  Theoretically, a cross-market merged hospital could have twice the 
bargaining power of another hospital, while also having half the output—that 
is, market share. 
In the past six years, there has been a drastic increase in consolidation 
among health-care providers resulting in the formation of major hospital 
systems.335  To adjust to the reality of these sprawling health systems, the 
antitrust laws should allow consolidation among smaller parties that seek to 
compete with larger systems.  Merging parties should be permitted to 
demonstrate to the agencies and courts that their proposed merger will allow 
them to increase their bargaining power and overcome the disparity in power 
between them and the larger health-care systems with whom they compete.  
For instance, the parties in Penn State Hershey could have argued that they 
sought to merge to better compete with several megasystems:  University of 
Pennsylvania Health System (“Penn Medicine”),336 Geisinger Health System 
(“Geisinger”),337 Community Health Systems (CHS),338 and WellSpan 
Health System (“WellSpan”).339  Because these systems offer payers more 
hospitals throughout Pennsylvania to fill holes in the payers’ health plans, 
cross-market research would suggest these systems have greater bargaining 
power than their market shares indicate.340 
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The merging parties in Penn State Hershey did, in fact, argue that the 
merger would not produce anticompetitive effects because its competitors—
Penn Medicine, Geisinger, CHS, and WellSpan—would respond to the 
merger by offering substitutable products, which would sufficiently constrain 
prices following the merger.341  However, despite finding that this response 
would “assuage some of the concerns that the proposed combination will 
have anticompetitive effects,” the Third Circuit rejected this argument 
because payers testified that Pinnacle and Hershey were necessary to their 
networks.342  The court recognized that Hershey and Pinnacle would face 
difficulties competing with such large, well-known, reputable systems.343  
However, the court ultimately could not find persuasive legal reasoning on 
which to allow the merger on this ground. 
With an increasing amount of evidence and research suggesting that cross-
market mergers have real effects on competition,344 the agencies and courts 
need to be willing to look deeper into the interactions among the relevant 
payers, parties, competitors, and patients.  Research should find a way to 
quantify parties’ bargaining power.  If this could be achieved, bargaining 
power may be a better proxy for hospital market share than patient discharge 
data.  Research is necessary to understand exactly how much a cross-market 
merger increases the bargaining power of one hospital relative to the 
bargaining power of its market rivals. 
In the meantime, without such research, agencies and courts should 
evaluate the relative strength of merging hospitals’ competitors based on 
reputation and cross-market connections.  The agencies should accept this 
efficiency argument and add it to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  The 
Guidelines should advise parties that they may succeed by showing their 
ability to compete will be enhanced postmerger and that merging will allow 
them to compete with cross-market merged firms that have a stronger 
bargaining position.  Market share in the hospital context should only be used 
as a baseline from which efficiency arguments (e.g., that mergers will lead to 
improved quality or more effective competition) should be given greater 
weight to tip the scale in favor of allowing hospitals to merge.345 
CONCLUSION 
Although courts remain skeptical, there are compelling reasons why 
certain efficiencies should be sufficient to rebut a presumption of 
anticompetitive effects.  Efficiencies are an integral part of the competition 
analysis and have the potential to bring considerable benefits to consumers.  
Mergers between health-care providers can strengthen competition and lead 
to cost savings and improved care for patients.  Because of their benefits, 
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efficiencies should be given greater weight, especially in analyses relating to 
health-care mergers, where the efficiencies gained will likely result in better 
patient outcomes.  After all, life and health are more important than the price 
one may pay. 
 
